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NOTE
DEWSNUP V. TIMM AND NOBELMAN V. AMERICAN
SAVINGS BANK: THE STRIP DOWN OF LIENS IN
CHAPTER 12 AND CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCIES
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words
mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty
Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."'
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 15, 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided Dewsnup
v. Timm.2 In a six-to-two decision, 3 the Court held that a debtor in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy could not strip down a creditor's lien on real property
to the value of the property securing the lien under section 506(d) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19784 (Bankruptcy Code).- In its opinion the
Court clearly stated an intent to limit its holding to the facts of the case.
6
However, section 506 applies to all chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, 7 and,
accordingly, debtors also have attempted to strip down undersecured liens
in reorganization plans under Chapter 12 and Chapter 13.8 As a result of
its analysis and statutory interpretation methodology, Dewsnup has left
unanswered the question of whether the strip down of undersecured liens
1. LEwis CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 198 (Messner ed. 1982) quoted in
Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Sainz-Dean (In re Sainz-Dean), 143 B.R. 784, 785 n.3 (D. Colo.
1992).
2. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
3. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 775. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor and
Kennedy joined. Id. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Souter joined.
Id. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988) (providing for bankruptcy court's avoidance of
disallowed secured liens); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code), Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990))
(repealing and replacing National Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
5. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
6. Id.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1990). Section 103(a) provides: "Except as
provided in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under
chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title." Id.
8. See infra notes 185-98 and accompanying text (describing process of strip down of
undersecured liens in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases).
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is still available in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 bankruptcies 9 and has raised
new questions about how debtors, creditors, and lower courts should inter-
pret the language of the Bankruptcy Code.'0
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in December 1992 to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank (In re Nobelman)" to address a split in the Circuits over the
strip down of residential mortgages in a Chapter 13 case.' 2 The Chapter 13
debtors in Nobelman had sought confirmation of a reorganization plan that
included the strip down of the mortgage on their primary residence. 3 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts' denial of confirmation of the plan
based on the plain meaning of the statute and the implications of Dewsnup.
4
Nobelman epitomizes many of questions that Dewsnup's analysis and meth-
odology raised or left unanswered.' 5 Thus, Nobelman represents an oppor-
tunity to address the problems of Dewsnup.
9. See Margaret Howard, Dew-What?, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Mar. 1992, at 1,
1-2 (suggesting some of uncertainties Dewsnup created in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcies).
10. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 780-81 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992). Researchers should
note that "Nobelman" is spelled as "Nobelman" in 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992) and in 129 B.R.
98 (D.N.D. Tex. 1991), but is spelled as "Nobleman" in 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992). This
Note will use "Nobelman" in all references.
12. See infra notes 201-15 and accompanying text (discussing split between courts of
appeals over whether Chapter 13 debtor can strip down residential mortgage to value of
collateral in reorganization plan).
13. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 968 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 654 (1992). In Nobelman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered whether a debtor's attempt to bifurcate a mortgage claim on the debtor's principal
residence using § 506 impermissibly modified the rights of the creditor as prohibited by §
1322(b)(2). Id. at 484. The debtors filed a Chapter 13 reorganization plan which proposed to
bifurcate the undersecured mortgage on their residence into a secured claim and an unsecured
claim and to treat the unsecured portion as a general unsecured claim. Id. at 485. The Fifth
Circuit noted that four other courts of appeals had adopted the position advocted by the
debtor, but that a significant number of bankruptcy courts had held bifurcation impermissible,
as it would vitiate the purpose of § 1322(b)(2). Id. at 486-87. The court also noted that the
Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992) preventing strip down
of liens under § 506, lent support to the position that bifurcation is impermissible. Nobelman,
968 F.2d at 487. Citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), as
support, the Fifth Circuit looked at the plain meaning of the statute in question. Nobelman,
968 F.2d at 487-88. The court found that § 1322(b)(2) clearly prohibits the modification of
the rights of holders of secured claims if the claim is secured by the debtor's principal residence.
Id. at 488. Applying the tenet of statutory construction that if two statutes conflict, the specific
statute should prevail over the general statute, the court held the language of § 1322(b)(2)
preventing bifurcation of the mortgage controls. Id. The court found that the legislative history
of the statute indicates that Congress intended that result. Id. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held
that § 1322(b)(2) prevents the bifurcation of a mortgage on the primary residence of the
debtor. Id. at 489.
14. Id. at 487-88.
15. See infra notes 145-75 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing problems of
Dewsnup holding).
THE STRIP DOWN OF LIENS
This Note first explains the strip down of liens in Chapter 7 and the
role of the bankruptcy discharge of debts in that process. A review of the
reasoning of Dewsnup, including an analysis of the majority's interpretation
of section 506 and of Justice Scalia's dissent, follows. This Note then
reviews the recent history of statutory interpretation by the Court in order
to determine Dewsnup's use in interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
After identifying many questions that Dewsnup either raises or leaves
unanswered, this Note turns its focus to the most significant question, how
Dewsnup applies to Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases. Beginning with an
explanation of the purposes of Chapter 12 and Chapter 13, this Note reviews
the conflict over strip downs in Chapter 13 cases and the arguments of
Nobelman and the conflicting courts of appeals over the application of
Dewsnup to that issue. An analysis of other problems created by the
application of Dewsnup to Chapter 13 cases yields the assessment that
Nobelman epitomizes the problems Dewsnup has created for bankruptcy.
Finally, this Note offers the conclusion that Nobelman provides the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to address many of the questions Dewsnup has
raised and then offers a methodology with which to address the issues the
Supreme Court faces in Nobelman.
II. THE STRIP DowN OF LiENs UNDER CHAPTER 7
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Strip down is an attempt by the debtor to reduce a lien on real property
securing a debt by the amount of the lien that exceeds the fair market value
of the collateral, leaving the debtor with a lower obligation on the debt. 6
The first step in the strip down process is the bifurcation 7 of the claim of
the creditor that the debtor's property secures.'" Section 506(a) 19 provides
16. See Theresa A. Caldarone, Note, Can a Debtor Void a Real Property Lien that
Exceeds the Value of the Collateral?: An Interpretation of Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1393, 1395 (1988) (criticizing debtor attempts to void real
property liens to extent they exceed value of collateral).
17. See WEBSTER'S Cou.aaE DicnoNARY 134 (Ist ed. 1991) (defining "bifurcation" as
noun form of bifurcate, which means to divide into two branches).
18. See Patricia Lindauer, Note, Optimizing the "Fresh Start" Mortgage Cramdown
Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 J.L. & CoM. 257, 261 n.26 (1992) (characterizing
strip down of residential mortgages as beyond fresh start that Congress intended for Chapter
13 bankruptcies).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). Section 506(a) reads in pertinent part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate
has an interest, . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property, . . . and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to
setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined
in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of
such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or
on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
1993]
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for the bifurcation of the allowed claim of the undersecured creditor into
two separate claims: a secured claim20 equal to the value of the collateral,
and an unsecured claim equal to the difference between the total underse-
cured claim and the value of the collateral. 2' The bankruptcy court deter-
mines the value of the collateral as a part of the bifurcation process.2
The second step of the strip down process is the avoidance of the
unsecured lien by the bankruptcy court, leaving the creditor with only its
secured lien against the debtor's property. In Chapter 7 cases the debtor
seeks avoidance through the operation of section 506(d)23 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which voids any portion of a lien that represents an unsecured claim. u
Therefore, section 506(d) voids the portion of the lien represented by the
claim that section 506(a) classifies as unsecured, leaving only the portion of
the lien represented by the claim that section 506(a) classifies as secured. 5
The bankruptcy court's grant to the debtor of a discharge of all prepetition
debts under section 72726 then relieves the debtor of any personal obligation
for the debt represented by the unsecured claim. 27 The debtor may either
pay off the stripped down lien or reaffirm it and retain the property with
a smaller lien encumbering the property.
2s
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing definitions of terms used in
Bankruptcy Code). "Claim" means a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right of payment. Id. § 101(5). A "lien"
means an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.
Id. § 101(37). Thus, a secured claim is a right to payment of a debt that has a lien on property
to ensure enforcement of that right. The amount of the secured claim equals the value of the
lien encumbered property. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
21. See Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theory of
Bankruptcy, 65 Am. BANKR. L.J. 373, 375 (1991) (describing process by which debtor strips
down undersecured lien under § 506(d)).
22. See supra note 19 (providing language of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), which provides for
determination of value of property securing creditor's claim).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988). Section 506(d) reads in pertinent part: "To the extent
that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien
is void ...." Id.
24. See Howard, supra note 21, at 375-76 (describing operation of § 506(d) in voiding
of unsecured portion of lien).
25. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (describing operation of § 506(a) on
undersecured liens).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988). Section 727(b) reads:
Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a) of
this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the
order for relief under this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is determined
under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before commencement of
the case, whether or not a proof of claim based on a such debt or liability is filed
under section 501 of this title, and whether or not a claim based on any such debt
or liability is allowed under section 502 of this title.
Id.
27. Id.
28. See Howard, supra note 21, at 391 (noting that ability to retain property after strip
down dependent on nonbankruptcy law).
THE STRIP DOWN OF LIENS
For example, several creditors loaned T. LaMar and Aletha Dewsnup
$119,000, secured by a deed of trust on two parcels of farmland in Utah
that the Dewsnups owned.29 After a subsequent default on these loans in
1984 and the dismissal of two Chapter 11 reorganization petitions, the
Dewsnups in 1987 filed a petition for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code.30 In an adversary proceeding, the bankruptcy court
determined the value of the land subject to the deed of trust to be $39,000.31
The Dewsnups then sought to have the bankruptcy court bifurcate the
creditor's claims into a $39,000 secured claim and an $80,000 unsecured
claim under § 506(a) and void the portion of the lien that the $80,000
unsecured claim represented.12 This would strip down the lien encumbering
the Dewsnup's property to $39,000.33 The Chapter 7 discharge would free
the Dewsnups from any personal obligations for the unsecured claim. 3 4 The
Dewsnups could then pay off the $39,000 remaining debt that their land
secured or reaffirm the remaining debt with the creditors and begin making
payments on that obligation.
33
III. THm ROLE OF THm FRESH START OF DISCHARGE IN SIP DowN
The fresh start concept underlies and shapes virtually every aspect of
the Bankruptcy Code.3 6 The purpose of this concept in bankruptcy is to
give "the honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new opportunity. ' 37 The
most important aspects of bankruptcy's fresh start are the conservation of
adequate property for a debtor's return to normal life and the protection
of the debtor from collection attempts by prepetition creditors. 38 The dis-
charge of debt is central to the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start policy,3 9
providing both asset conservation and debtor protection.4°
29. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 775 (1992).
30. Id. at 776.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text (describing strip down process in
Chapter 7 case).
34. See supra notes 26-27, infra notes 36-49, and accompanying text (describing effect
of discharge on personal obligations of debtor).
35. See supra notes 26-27, infra notes 36-49, and accompanying text (describing effect
of discharge on personal obligations of debtor).
36. See Doug Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C.
L. Rav. 723, 723 (1980) (discussing different theories of policy underlying fresh start of
bankruptcy).
37. See Charles J. Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEo. WAsK. L. Rav. 56, 56-57 (1990) (quoting
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) for proposition that one of central policies
of bankruptcy is to give new opportunity to debtor).
38. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6086.
39. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L.
Ev. 1393, 1393 (1985) (discussing protections and trade-offs of discharge of debts in bank-
ruptcy law).
40. See Rendleman, supra note 36, at 750-54 (describing characteristics of fresh start in
Bankruptcy Code).
1993]
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The Bankruptcy Code increases the protection that was available to the
consumer debtor under the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 41 Section 727
provides for the grant of a discharge in Chapter 7 cases.42 Other sections
of the Bankruptcy Code govern discharges in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13
cases.43 The House Report accompanying the House of Representatives
version of the Bankruptcy Code described section 727 as the "heart of the
fresh start provisions of the bankruptcy law." 44 Under section 727, unless
the debtor has committed certain prohibited acts,4 the individual may obtain
a discharge from most existing debts by the surrender of certain assets or
a portion of future earnings." This discharge releases the debtor from many
prior financial obligations and protects him from adverse consequences that
might result from his bankruptcy.
47
The bankruptcy discharge, therefore, fulfills the purpose of the strip
down. 48 It relieves the debtor of any personal obligation for the portion of
the debt that exceeds the judicially determined value of the real property
securing the debt 49 In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court addressed the contested
question of whether the bankruptcy discharge removes a lien on real property
to the same extent as it relieves a debtor's personal obligation.
IV. TIm CONFLICT OVER STRIP DowN
A great deal of controversy surrounded attempts by debtors to strip
down undersecured liens in bankruptcy. 0 In two similar Chapter 7 cases,
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Tenth
Circuit issued conflicting decisions regarding the strip down of liens.5 In
41. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6086.
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) (providing that portion of Bankruptcy Code that
includes § 727 applies only to Chapter 7 case).
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 1228 (1988) (providing for discharge of debt in Chapter 12 case);
11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (providing for discharge of debt in Chapter 13 case).
44. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 384 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6340.
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(l)-(10) (specifying circumstances under which bankruptcy
court will not grant discharge).
46. See Jackson, supra note 39, at 1393 (stating that bankruptcy's discharge of debt
provides fresh start for debtor).
47. See id. (providing release from financial obligations and protection from adverse
consequences of release as aspects of bankruptcy discharge's fresh start).
48. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing goal of strip down process).
49. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text (describing operation of bankruptcy
discharge).
50. See Howard, supra note 21, at 374 n.2 (providing list of cases permitting strip down
of undersecured liens and list of cases denying strip down to debtor).
51. Compare Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1306-11 (3d Cir.
1989) (holding that Chapter 7 debtor could void portion of lien secured by real property which
exceeded value of property) with Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 593 (10th
Cir. 1990) (holding that Chapter 7 debtor could not void unsecured portion of lien and redeem
property by paying fair market value of property), aff'd, Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773,
779 (1992).
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1989 the Third Circuit in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n5 2
held that a debtor can strip down a lien under section 506.13 The Third
Circuit based its holding on both its reading of the plain meaning of section
506 and the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code.14 In 1990 the Tenth
Circuit in Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup)55 held that a debtor could
not strip down an undersecured lien.5 6
52. 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989).
53. Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1306-11 (3d Cir. 1989). In
Gaglia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether a Chapter
7 debtor could void the portion of secured liens that exceeded the value of the underlying
property under § 506(a) and § 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1305. The debtors filed
an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court, following their discharge from a Chapter 7
liquidation case, seeking to avoid a $200,000 mortgage on their residence to the extent it
exceeded the alleged value of $34,000. Id. The bankruptcy court denied relief on the basis
that § 506 applies only to property of the estate and not property released or abandoned by
the estate. Id. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of relief. Id. On
appeal, the Third Circuit first considered whether § 506 applies only to property administered
by the estate. Id. at 1306-07. The court found that the majority of bankruptcy and district
courts that had considered this question had concluded that § 506 does apply to such property.
Id. The creditors argued that § 506(a) does not apply when the debtor had no equity in the
property, as was the case with the Gaglias. Id. at 1307. Rejecting this argument as unsupported
by the plain meaning of the statute, the court of appeals held that § 506 allows the creditors
to void the mortgage to the extent it is unsecured. Id. at 1308. The court further rejected
creditor arguments that the debtors were not "parties in interest," that § 506 does not apply
to property which the state did not administer, and that this use of § 506 would conflict with
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1309-10. Finally, the Third Circuit found that
its holding was neither inequitable to the creditors nor would it discourage the use of the
reorganization Chapters in favor of Chapter 7. Id. at 1311.
As an example, application of the Third Circuit's holding to the facts of Dewsnup v.
Timm, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992), results in the Dewsnups
having an $80,000 personal obligation discharged and an $80,000 lien voided. Supra notes 29-
33 and accompanying text. Following their discharge from bankruptcy, a $39,000 lien would
remain on their property. Supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. But see infra note 56
(providing example of opposite outcome by application of holding of Dewsnup to its facts).
54. Id. at 1306-11.
55. 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
56. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 593 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112
S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992). In Dewsnup, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
considered whether a Chapter 7 debtor may use § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code to void the
unsecured portion of a lien on property abandoned by the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 589. The
debtors sought to void liens on farmland in an adversary proceeding within a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case. Id. The bankruptcy court denied this relief, holding that the avoidance of
the lien is not an intended use of § 506. Id. The district court affirmed that holding. Id. The
Tenth Circuit first noted that although the majority of courts had adopted the position the
debtors urged, a strong minority of courts had rejected the approach as inconsistent with the
section's purpose. Id. The Tenth Circuit turned to an analysis of the statutory language,
finding that § 506 applies only where the bankruptcy estate has an interest in the property.
Id. at 590. The estate had abandoned the property at issue and therefore did not have the
requisite interest in the property for the application of § 506. Id. at 590-91. The court of
appeals held that if the property was abandoned by the estate, § 506 could not apply. Id. at
591. The court rejected the approach found in Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 889
F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989), on the basis of the plain language of the statute and the abandonment
19931
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In Dewsnup the debtor defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust
on two parcels of farmland owned by the debtor.5 7 Before a foreclosure
sale could occur, the debtor filed a petition seeking liquidation under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.5 Because the debtor's $119,000 debt
exceeded the value of the collateral by approximately $80,000, the debtor
filed an adversary proceeding prior to liquidation seeking to void the
unsecured portion of the creditor's lien. 9 Both the bankruptcy court and
the district court rejected the debtor's assertions that strip down was an
intended use of section 506. 0 The bankruptcy court based its decision on
the assumption that the bankruptcy trustee had abandoned the subject
property pursuant to section 554. 6 1 On appeal the Tenth Circuit rejected
the Gaglia court's approach and held that the plain language of section
506, together with the abandonment provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
indicated that Congress did not intend for a Chapter 7 debtor to use section
506 to retain property abandoned by the estate. 62 Upon petition by the
debtors, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Tenth Circuit to resolve
the conflict between the two courts of appeals.
63
V. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR ARGUMENTS IN DEwsNUP v. Thm
In Dewsnup the debtor argued that the Court should read sections
506(a) and 506(d) together because they are complementary., According to
the debtor, section 506(a) bifurcates classes of allowed claims 65 into allowed
provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 591-92; see supra note 53 and
accompanying text (discussing Gaglia). The Tenth Circuit noted that the effect of its holding
was consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's redemption provision, § 722, which allows re-
demption of only abandoned personal property. Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 592.
As an example, application of the Tenth Circuit's holding to its facts results in the
Dewsnups only having an $80,000 personal obligation discharged. Supra notes 29-33 and
accompanying text. Following their discharge from bankruptcy, the entire $119,000 lien would
remain on their property. Supra note 29 and accompanying text. But see supra note 53
(providing example of opposite outcome by application of holding of Gaglia v. First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989)).
57. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 775 (1992).
58. Id. at 776; see generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988) (providing procedures for
bankruptcy liquidation of debtor's estate).
59. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
60. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676, 683 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988), aff'd,
908 F.2d 588, 593 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992). The United States
District Court for the District of Utah affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision without
issuance of an opinion. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 112 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1992).
61. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
62. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 592 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112
S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992).
63. Dewsnup v. Timm, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 949
(1991).
64. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 776-77 (1992).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Section 502(a) reads in pertinent part:
"A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed,
unless a party in interest, . . . objects." Id.
THE STRIP DOWN OF LIENS
secured claims and allowed unsecured claims. 6 The portion of an allowed
claim that equals the value of the real property is an allowed secured claim.
6 7
Section 506(d) protects a lien to the extent it secures this allowed secured
claim.68 Any portion of an allowed claim representing a lien on real property
that exceeds the value of the property is an allowed unsecured claim, and
the lien it represents is void under section 506(d).
69
Conversely, the creditors in Dewsnup primarily asserted that sections
506(a) and 506(d) are not rigidly tied together.70 According to the creditors,
section 506(a) fulfills the function of classifying claims at the time of the
distribution of the estate to ensure fairness to unsecured creditors.71 The
creditors argued that section 506(d) applies to the time of foreclosure and
serves no distributional purpose if the estate abandons the property, as
alleged.72 Alternatively, the creditors, joined by the United States as amicus
curiae, asserted that the phrase "allowed secured claim" in section 506(d)
is not an indivisible term of art, as defined by reference to section 506(a).73
Instead, the creditors argued, the Court should read each term of this
phrase independently .of the other terms to refer to a claim that is first
allowed and then secured.74 Therefore, section 506(d) voids only claims that
are not allowed and are secured.75
VI. THE MAjorn1's REASONING IN DEwsNup v. Thnm
The majority, in weighing these two conflicting views, began its analysis
by seeking to limit the impact of its holding, stating an intent to focus only
on the facts before it and specifically declining to opine whether the phrase
in question had different meanings elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code.76
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun found that the differing positions
on the meaning of section 506 were evidence of ambiguity in that section's
language and relationship to other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
77
Acknowledging some difficulty with the creditors' alternative argument, the
Dewsnup Court nonetheless adopted it as the "better of several ap-
proaches." 8 The Court noted with disapproval that the adoption of the
debtor's argument would result in the freezing of the creditor's interest at
the then-current value of the collateral, denying the creditor the benefit of
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any appreciation in the value of the collateral prior to foreclosure and
providing the debtor with a windfall.7 9
The Dewsnup Court next noted that under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
liens on real property passed through bankruptcy proceedings unaffected. s0
Finding ambiguity in section 506 and silence on the part of Congress
regarding a change of pre-Code rules, the Court held that section 506(d)
does not allow the stripping down of undersecured liens to the value of the
collateral securing the lien. 8' Given that Congress does not write "on a
clean slate," the Court concluded that it must give pre-Code rules proper
effect.82 The Court noted that two recent cases, Johnson v. Home State
Bank 3 and Farrey v. Sanderfoot,84 had each held that the Bankruptcy Code
codified the rule of Long v. Bullard5 that a creditor's right to foreclose on
its mortgage survives bankruptcy. 6 Finding that the legislative history of
the Bankruptcy Code provided no evidence of Congress's intent to modify
this rule, the Court held that although the discharge of the Chapter 7
petition extinguishes the personal liability of the debtor, an in rem lien
remains against the property securing the debt. 7 On this basis, the Court
affirmed the Tenth Circuit's refusal to permit a Chapter 7 debtor to strip




82. Id. at 777-78.
83. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
84. 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1831 (1991). In Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991), the
Supreme Court considered the question of whether § 522(t) allows the debtor to avoid a lien
on a homestead when the lien was granted under a divorce decree and when the lien secured
no more than the value of the non-debtor spouse's former interest. Id. at 1827. The debtor
sought to have voided a lien that a state court had placed on the debtor's property to secure
an award to the debtor's former spouse at divorce. Id. To address this question, the Supreme
Court looked to the language of § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1829. The Court
found the term lien "fing" to have a temporal meaning. Id. Therefore, the Court held,
unless the debtor had the property interest to which the lien attached at some point before
the lien attached, he cannot avoid the fixing of the lien under § 522(f). Id. The Supreme
Court then found that this interpretation was fully consistent with the intent of Congress for
this provision. Id. at 1829-30. With such a finding, the Farrey Court held that the debtor
could not avoid the lien on his property under § 522(f). Id. at 1831.
85. 117 U.S. 617 (1886). In Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886), the Supreme Court
considered the effect of the discharge in bankruptcy on the right of a creditor to enforce a
lien upon real property in existence at the time of the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceedings. Id. at 620. Following a suit by a creditor enforce a lien, the debtors sought a
decree declaring the lien on real property discharged in a prior bankruptcy. Id. at 619. The
Court held that the bankruptcy laws preserved the lien and the claim of homestead did not
relieve the property from the operation of the lien in existence prior to bankruptcy. Id. at
621.
86. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992); see Johnson, Ill S. Ct. at 2154
(stating that Bankruptcy Code codified rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected);
Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1829 (same).
87. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778-79.
88. Id. at 779.
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rests almost entirely upon its reading of the intent of Congress in its passage
of section 506(d). s9 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code supports
the Court's determination of Congress's intent.9° Yet despite this consistency
with legislative intent, Dewsnup is contrary to a plain reading of section
506(d) and the phrase "allowed secured claim." 91 It is this inconsistency
which most concerned Justice Scalia in his dissent.Y
VII. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT IN SUPPORT OF PLAIN MEANING
Justice Scalia, a strong proponent of plain meaning in statutory con-
struction,93 criticized the majority holding as replacing what Congress said
with what the Court thinks Congress ought to have said.94 Joined by Justice
Souter, 9" Justice Scalia asserted that in so doing, the Court impaired well-
established rules of statutory construction for future use.9
Calling the Dewsnup holding the "methodological antithesis" 97 of United
States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,98 a case in which the Court had relied
exclusively on plain meaning, 99 Justice Scalia noted four primary objections
89. See id. (stating that if Congress intended to change pre-Code law it would comment
in Code or legislative history).
90. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 357 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6313 (stating that "Subsection (d) permits liens to pass through the
bankruptcy case unaffected"). But see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854 (stating that "Subsection (d) provides that to the
extent a secured claim is not allowed, its lien is void").
91. See infra notes 93-110 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's criticisms
of majority's reasoning).
92. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779-88 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(questioning majority's use of legislative history despite plain meaning of statute).
93. Cf. Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions:
The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. Ray. 823, 879-81
(1991) (criticising bankruptcy jurisprudence of Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist).
94. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 780 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 779 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 780 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
99. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-49 (1989). In Ron Pair,
the Supreme Court considered the question of whether § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
entitles a creditor to receive postpetition interest on a nonconsensual oversecured claim allowed
ii'the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 237. The United States, as creditor, sought postpetition
interest on a claim for unpaid withholding taxes, which had been perfected through a tax lien
on property owned by the debtor. Id. The Government argued that § 506(b) allows recovery
of postpetition interest on its claim, since the debtor's property had a value greater than the
amount of the tax debt. Id. The Ron Pair Court started its analysis by stating that the task
of determining the meaning of § 506 begins where all statutory interpretation questions must
begin, with the language of the statute itself. Id. at 241. The Court found the language of
the statute plain, and held where that is the case, reference to legislative history and pre-Code
practice is unnecessary. Id. Finding that its interpretation was mandated by the grammatical
structure of the statute, the Supreme Court held that the plain language of § 506 provided
for postpetition interest in the case before it. Id. at 241-42. The Court rejected arguments of
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to the majority's holding.' ° First, and most importantly, he argued that
the majority opinion is at odds with the jurisprudence in other recent
decisions.10 1 The Court rested its decision upon policy intuitions of a
legislative character and on the principle that an ambiguous statute cannot
change pre-Code law without the "imprimatur of legislative history" indi-
cating an intent to do so.' °2 In doing so, the Court ignored the plain
meaning of the statute, which, according to Justice Scalia, clearly expresses
an intent to alter pre-Code practices. 03
Second, Justice Scalia criticized the Court for finding ambiguity in
section 506 merely because of the presence of conflicting positions on its
meaning.' 4 He pointed out that the majority's mode of analysis in finding
ambiguity means that every litigated statute is ambiguous. 05 Third, Justice
Scalia characterized the Court's decision as founded in a pro creditor policy
judgment, favoring the rights of the creditor over the debtor.'°6 His concern
centered on the fact that policy considerations were at work in the Court's
statutory construction analysis.' ° Finally, Justice Scalia criticized the stilted
"one-subsection-at-a-time" approach of the majority, which violates the
rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. 08 Justice Scalia
found that the majority's approach produces an interpretation that creates
surplusage, redundancy, and absurdity in section 506(d).1 9 The outcome of
the Court's holding, Justice Scalia forecast, is unpredictability in the Bank-
ruptcy Code." 0 Whether Justice Scalia is correct or not will depend on
whether Dewsnup is an aberration or the beginning of the Court's shift
away from plain meaning in statutory construction.
VIII. AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN DEWSNUP
The principles of statutory construction in Dewsnup represent a marked
divergence from what had been the clear path of the Supreme Court's
treatment of bankruptcy cases since 1989."' Indeed, Dewsnup creates some
the debtor that legislative intent and pre-Code practice indicated a different interpretation of
the statute. Id. at 243-48. The Court found no legislative history or pre-Code practice to
support the debtor's argument, holding that the plain meaning of the statute should be
conclusive, except in the rare circumstances where the plain meaning is clearly and demonstrably
at odds with the legislative intent. Id. at 248-49.
100. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779-88 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 786-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 781 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 786-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Scaiia, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 780-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 782-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 93, at 879-90 (discussing bankruptcy jurisprudence
of Supreme Court after 1988).
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hope for a shift away from the strict textualist or plain meaning approach
that has characterized the Rehnquist Court" 2 toward the broad considera-
tions of the underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code that marked the
early decisions following the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.113
Prior to 1989 the Court generally considered the language of the statute
to be only the starting point in the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code."
4
In Kelly v. Robinson," 5 Justice Powell wrote that the Court's deference to
federalism and the policy of following pre-Code law, unless otherwise
indicated by the Bankruptcy Code, directed the Court to look beyond the
language of the statute in interpreting the meaning of the statute." 6 Quoting
an earlier Supreme Court decision," 7 Justice Powell noted that the Court
had followed "with particular care" in bankruptcy cases the normal rule
of statutory construction that if Congress intends for legislation to change
the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent clear."'
Indeed, during the first eight years following the passage of the Bankruptcy
112. See id. at 879-81 (describing Rehnquist Court's reliance on plain meaning in statutory
interpretation).
113. See Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U.
Prrr. L. Rnv. 477, 558-75 (1988) (describing Supreme Court's principles of decision in cases
under Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 through Court's 1986 Term).
114. See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 93, at 828-29 (describing Supreme Court's use of
policy in statutory interpretation of Bankruptcy Code in cases prior to 1988).
115. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
116. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1986). In Kelly, the Supreme Court considered
whether restitution obligations, imposed as conditions of probation in state criminal proceed-
ings, were dischargeable under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 38. The debtor was
ordered to repay wrongfully received welfare benefits as a condition of the suspension of a
criminal sentence. Id. at 39. Following a voluntary Chapter 7 petition, the debtor filed an
adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that her bankruptcy had
discharged this obligation. Id. at 39-40. In deciding this issue, the Court first looked at the
releVant statutes, § 101, governing the definition of "debt," and § 523, governing exceptions
to discharge, in light of the history of bankruptcy courts' deference to criminal judgments
and of the States' interest in the administration of their criminal justice system. Id. at 40-44.
The Kelly Court found that under the Bankruptcy Act most courts had refused to allow the
discharge in bankruptcy to affect a judgment of a state criminal court. Id. at 44-46. This was
the backdrop under which the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. Id. at 46. The Kelly Court noted
that it had previously held that the normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress
intended for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes
that intent specific. Id. at 47. The Court also held that its interpretation of the Code must
reflect federalism, as shown by the bankruptcy court's respect for the States' interest in
administering their criminal justice system. Id. at 47-49. Turning to the language of § 523(a)(7),
the Court found no significant difference between court-ordered restitution and a traditional
criminal fine, which the Code exempted from discharge. Id. at 50-53. Given the strong interest
of the States, the uniform construction of the former Act exempting criminal fines from
discharge, and the absence of any significant evidence that Congress intended a change, the
Kelly Court held that judicially-ordered restitution in a criminal case is not dischargeable under
the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 53.
1t7. Id. at 47 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986), to state that normal rule of statutory construction is if Congress
intended change in interpretation of judicially created concept, it makes intent specific).
118. Kelly, 479 U.S. at 47.
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Code, the Court developed a jurisprudence that was limited in constitutional
scope, proreorganization, deferential t6 state laws, and procreditor, using
these values in conjunction with rules of statutory construction. 19
By 1989 the composition of the Supreme Court changed significantly.
2
0
The Supreme Court's approach to statutory construction changed as a
result. The Rehnquist Court announced its exclusive reliance on the text of
the Bankruptcy Code' 2' in United Savings Assn v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates.'2 The Court joined unanimously in an opinion by Justice Scalia
that eschewed policy, pre-Code law, and legislative history'2 and held that
an undersecured creditor is not entitled to interest on its collateral to assure
adequate protection during the automatic stay of the bankruptcy petition.' 24
In 1989 in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,'2 a sharply divided
119. See Tabb, supra note 113, at 558-81 (discussing Supreme Court's application of
principles of decision in cases involving Bankruptcy Code in eight years following Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978).
120. Three Justices retired during the 1980s: Potter Stewart in 1981, Warren Burger in
1986, and Lewis Powell in 1987. See Christopher E. Smith & Linda Fry, Vigilance or
Accommodation: The Changing Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, 42 S'ACUSE L. REv.
893, 893 n.3 (1991) (analyzing effect of change in composition of Supreme Court on religious
freedom). President Reagan appointed Justice William Rehnquist as Chief Justice and Sandra
Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy as Justices. Id. President Bush followed
the conservative trend during his term by appointing David Souter to replace Justice William
Brennan and Clarence Thomas to replace Justice Thurgood Marshall. Id.
121. See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 93, at 837 (discussing beginning of Supreme Court's
reliance on plain meaning for statutory construction).
122. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
123. See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 93, at 837 (describing Supreme Court's exclusive
reliance on plain meaning in Timbers, 484 U.S. 365 (1988)).
124. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 382
(1988). In Timbers, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether undersecured creditors
are entitled to compensation under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988) for the delay in foreclosure
on its collateral caused by the automatic stay. Id. at 369. The creditor had sought the payment
of interest during the automatic stay of § 362 on the amount estimated to be realized at
foreclosure sale or relief from the stay for lack of adequate protection of- its interest in the
collateral. Id. at 368-69. The creditor asserted that the phrase "interest in property" in §
362(d)(1) includes a secured party's right to take immediate possession of collateral upon
default and apply it to the payment of the debt. Id. at 370-71. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, characterized statutory construction as a "holistic endeavor." Id. at 371. The Court
.then reviewed the meaning of the disputed phrase in light of other provisions in the Bankruptcy
Code dealing with the rights of secured creditors. Id. at 371-76. The Timbers Court held that
the language of those provisions indicates that the "interest in property" protected by § 362
does not include a secured party's right to foreclose. Id. at 376. Finally, the Court rejected
the creditors argument that the Court's interpretation was inconsistent with other sections of
the Bankruptcy Code and was unsupported by the legislative history of the Code. Id. at 377-
81. Thus, the Court found that an undersecured creditor is not entitled to interest on its
collateral during the automatic stay to assure adequate protection under § 362. Id. at 382; see
also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing that filing of petition operates as
stay against most collection actions against debtor or debtor's property with respect to pre-
petition debt); 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing for relief from automatic
stay if lack of adequate protection of creditor's interest in debtor's property).
125. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
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Court' 6 held, based on the placement of a comma in section 506(b), that
an oversecured nonconsensual lienholder was entitled to postpetition inter-
est. 27 The Ron Pair decision, which Justice Blackmun authored and which
Justice O'Connor's dissent called a "capricious bit of punctuation,"'
completely eviscerated the standing presumption of the Supreme Court that
pre-Code law applies except when explicitly changed by Congress. 129
Finally, in 1990 the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare v. Davenport30 cast aside the considerations of federalism
and pre-Code practice announced in Kelly and looked to the plain meaning
of the statute to interpret the full-compliance discharge of Chapter 13 to
include criminal restitution obligations.' Since Davenport, the Court's blind
allegiance to this textualist approach, forsaking other traditional consider-
ations in statutory construction in favor of the Bankruptcy Code's plain
meaning, has been the defining feature of bankruptcy decisions from the
Rehnquist Court. 32 If not dispositive, then plain meaning appears to have
been at least presumptively controlling.' It has been the deciding factor in
126. See id. at 236 (providing Justices joining in majority). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Blackmun in the majority. Id. Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined in Justice O'Connor's dissent. Id. at 249.
127. Id. at 241-42.
128. Id. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129. See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 93, at 844 (describing effect of Ron Pair Court's
use of plain meaning on presumption that pre-Code law remains unchanged except when
specifically indicated).
130. 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
131. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 556-64 (1990). In
Davenport, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether restitution obligations arising
from criminal convictions are dischargeable debts under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Id.. at 555. The debtors had filed an adversary action in their Chapter 13 case seeking a
declaration that their restitution payments, imposed as a condition of their probation on
welfare fraud convictions, were dischargeable debts. Id. at 556. The Davenport Court began
its analysis by citing the fundamental canon of statutory construction that interpretation of
the statute begins with the language of the statute itself. Id. at 557-58. The Court looked to
§ 101(4)(A) and found that Congress broadly defined the term "claim" as a "right to
payment." Id. at 558-60. The Court found the plain meaning of the phrase "right to payment"
is an enforceable obligation, regardless of the objectives of the State in imposing the obligation.
Id. at 558-59. The Supreme Court concluded that restitution payments fail within the plain
meaning of "right to payment," with neither the purpose or method of enforcement placing
the payments outside that definition. Id. at 560. Rejecting arguments that other sections of
the Bankruptcy Code supported a different. conclusion, the Davenport Court held that such
restitution payments are dischargeable under Chapter 13 proceedings. Id. at 564. The Court
noted its decision was not a retreat from Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), which had
held similar payments nondischargeable under Chapter 7, because the plain statutory language
at issue in Davenport revealed Congress's intent not to exempt restitution payments from
discharge under Chapter 13. Davenport, 495 U.S. at 563.
132. See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 93, at 879 (characterizing plain meaning as most
striking feature of Rehnquist Court's bankruptcy decisions).
133. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT. Rav. 231, 249 (discussing important role of plain meaning in
Supreme Court's statutory interpretation cases).
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eight of the ten Bankruptcy Code interpretation cases decided between Kelly
and Dewsnup.
3 4
This focus on textualism has caused an erosion of bankruptcy jurispru-
dence and the demise of the presumption that Congress generally codified
pre-Code law into the Bankruptcy Code unless a provision specifically altered
pre-Code law. 3 5 Plain meaning also has undermined consistency of policy."
6
Despite Justice Scalia's pronouncement to the contrary, 37 the textual ap-
proach to statutory construction has caused uncertainty in the interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Code.'38 Because the Court has decided each case based
only on each Justice's individual interpretation of the language of the statute
in question, the Rehnquist Court's bankruptcy cases have produced no
underlying policy or principles that could guide lower courts in future
statutory interpretation questions. m With each case standing alone and
unconnected, uncertainty is the result."4'
Dewsnup represents a departure from this textualist drift and a return
to many of the considerations that Justice Powell espoused in Kelly."4 First,
the Dewsnup Court found ambiguity in the text simply on the basis of
differing positions of the parties and looked to legislative history for evidence
of the meaning of the statute."'2 Second, the Court reasserted a pro creditor
134. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 531 (1991) (holding in unanimous decision
that clarity in statutory language precludes use of congressional intent and policy considera-
tions); Toibb v. Radloff, III S. Ct. 2197, 2199 (1991) (holding that clear statutory language
is dispositive and therefore no need exists to look to legislative intent); Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2153-55 (1991) (finding basis for holding in statutory language and
using legislative history to corroborate interpretation); Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833, 1837
(1991) (basing holding on phrase "would have been entitled" in § 522(0(1)); Farrey v.
Sanderfoot, III S. Ct. 1825, 1828-30 (1991) (finding plain reading of word "fixing" in §
522(f)(1) dispositive in proper interpretation of statute); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare
v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-60 (1990) (basing holding on plain meaning of phrase "right
to payment" in § 101); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989)
(basing interpretation of § 506(b) on placement of comma); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 378-82 (1988) (using legislative history, pre.Code
law and bankruptcy policy oniy to show consistency with plain reading of statutory language).
But see Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58, 63-67 (1990) (using legislative history and basing
decision on policy consideration of promoting reorganizations); United States v. Energy
Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549-51 (1990) (basing decision on policy consideration of
promoting reorganizations).
135. See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 93, at 879-81 (discussing impact of Supreme Court's
reliance on plain meaning in statutory construction).
136. See id. at 882-83 (stating lack of consistent policy direction as one result of Supreme
Court's reliance on plain meaning in statutory construction).
137. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 787-88 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining
that majority decision will destroy predictability of Bankruptcy Code).
138. See Tabb & Lawless, supra note 93, at 880-81 (discussing lack of consistent bankruptcy
jurisprudence as effect of Supreme Court's reliance on plain meaning in statutory construction).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court bases for
interpretation of Bankruptcy Code prior to 1989).
142. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 777 (1992).
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position, noting that to accept the debtor's argument would cause a loss to
the creditor and a windfall to the debtor if the collateral appreciated in
value.143 Most important, the Court returned to the policy of considering
judicially-created pre-Code law unchanged unless otherwise indicated by the
Bankruptcy Code. 144
Dewsnup appears to be a confusing aberration in the Supreme Court's
bankruptcy jurisprudence. In each of the four cases since Dewsnup involving
statutory interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, plain meaning has played
a dispositive role to the exclusion of legislative history and policy consid-
erations. 41 Oddly, Justice Blackmun, author of the Dewsnup decision, wrote
the majority opinion in the most recent of these cases.146 Thus, Dewsnup
provides little hope that the Court will develop a coherent methodology for
the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.1 47
IX. FURTHER QUEsTIoNs RAISED BY DEWSNUp
Dewsnup creates a number of problems that extend well beyond the
declared reach of its holding. First, despite the Court's encouraging reliance
on pre-Code law and legislative history in its decision, its analysis destroys
predictability by impairing well-established rules of statutory interpreta-
tion.1 48 For example, the Court has often invoked the normal rule of
statutory construction that identical words used in different sections of the
same statute are intended to have the same meaning. 49 The Court's use of
143. Id. at 778.
144. Id. at 778-79.
145. See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (1992) (Blackmun, J.) (citing
Toibb and Ron Pair Enters. to hold that clarity of statutory language at issue obviates need
for inquiry into legislative history); Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1391 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (citing Toibb and noting that appeals
to legislative history are appropriate only to resolve statutory ambiguity); Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (Thomas, J.) (Stevens, J., concurring and
urging use of legislative history) (citing Ron Pair Enters. to hold that court should turn to
one canon of statutory construction before all others: courts must presume that legislature
says what it means and means what it says in statute); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 1011, 1015 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (Stevens and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (finding no
unequivocal expression of waiver of sovereign immunity in statute).
146. See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (1992) (Blackmun, J.) (citing
Toibb and Ron Pair Enters. to hold that clarity of statutory language at issue obviates need
for inquiry into legislative history).
147. See supra notes 111-34 and accompanying text (discussing trends in interpretation of
Bankruptcy Code by Supreme Court).
148. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 780 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See Estate of Cowart v. Ni cklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2596 (1992) (stating
that basic canon of statutory construction is that identical terms within act bear same meaning);
Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992) (stating that consistency of usage of term
within statute is presumed); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson
v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) to state normal rule of statutory
construction that identical words used in different parts of same act are intended to have same
meaning).
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what Justice Scalia called "the one-subsection-at-a-time"' 50 approach to
statutory interpretation seems artificial and poorly suited for universal
application to the Bankruptcy Code. However, the rule of construction
found in section 102(8) of the Bankruptcy Code recognizes that terms may
have different meanings in different areas of the Code."'S The Court's
holding invites future argument that the language "allowed secured claim"
has a different meaning in other areas of the Bankruptcy Code. 52 One
bankruptcy court has already interpreted Dewsnup as giving the term
"secured claim" different meanings in the various provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 153 This ambiguity will continue to exist until the Court provides
further guidance.1
54
Second, the Dewsnup Court's basis for finding ambiguity is either overly
simplistic or hopelessly obscured. The Court found the statute to be am-
biguous because the parties disagreed about the meaning of section 506(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code.5 5 Following this line of reasoning, each time
adverse parties disagree about statutory language in the future, the Court
will find ambiguity in the statute and seek to ascertain legislative intent. 5 6
This poorly crafted analysis provides little guidance for statutory interpre-
tation and undercuts Dewsnup's significance in the Supreme Court's bank-
ruptcy jurisprudence 57
Dewsnup may also create practical problems that interfere with the
intended operation of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, the holding in
Dewsnup may eliminate an undersecured lienholder's post-bifurcation, un-
secured claim to any distribution from the proceeds of the estate. 5 If the
undersecured creditor asserts a claim for the full amount of the debt and
under Dewsnup has a lien that fully survives the discharge, then general
bankruptcy principles prohibiting dual claims for the same debt should
preclude the undersecured creditor from asserting a claim to distribution
for the unsecured portion of the debt. 59 However, a second possibility
150. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 781 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 102(8) (1988). Section 102(8) reads in pertinent part: "[A] definition,
contained in a section of this title that refers to another section of this title, does not, for the
purpose of such reference, affect the meaning of a term used in such other section .... ." Id.
152. See Howard, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing potential problem of statutory term
having different meanings in different parts of Bankruptcy Code). For example, will the
Court's interpretation of "allowed secured claim" be the same for § 1325(a)(5) and § 1225(a)(5)
as Dewsnup held it to be for § 506(d)? Id.
153. In re Doss, 143 B.R. 952, 954 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1992).
154. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties created by
various methods of statutory interpretation).
155. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 777 (1992).
156. See id. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that majority's mode of
analysis makes every litigated statute ambiguous).
157. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (arguing that Dewsnup is aberration
in current Supreme Court bankruptcy jurisprudence).
158. See Howard supra note 9, at 2 (arguing that Dewsnup may disrupt proper payment
of undersecured creditor's unsecured claim).
159. Id.
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under Dewsnup is that the undersecured lienholder will have his cake and
eat it too: asserting an unsecured claim to distribution and retaining a lien
on the debtor's property after discharge. This second possibility raises serious
questions about the proper oversight of a subsequent foreclosure.'60 For
example, will the trustee continue to have powers over distribution of the
proceeds of the sale of the collateral after discharge? If there are multiple
lienholders, who will insure proper distribution of the sale proceeds? Dews-
nup neither anticipates nor answers these questions.
The procreditor policy that played a role in the Dewsnup holding also
creates a practical problem in the operation of the Bankruptcy Code. The
Dewsnup Court reasoned that any postpetition appreciation of the property
should accrue to the benefit of the undersecured creditor, and not to the
benefit of unsecured creditors or the debtor. 161 However, appreciation of
the value of the property may be property acquired after the commencement
of a bankruptcy case'62 and, therefore, not property of the estate under
section 541(a)(1). 163 If so, then the undersecured creditor is not entitled to
any appreciation of the property after the filing of the petition in a Chapter
7. case.
Dewsnup's concern for the creditor's right to appreciation in the value
of the property assumes that the creditor will receive more at a foreclosure
sale than the judicially-determined value of the collateral.' 4 However, this
reasoning ignores the cost of subsequent foreclosure on the debtor's prop-
erty, the opportunity costs of the creditor in bidding-in for the property,
and the real risk to the creditor of postpetition depreciation of the prop-
erty. 165 It also ignores .the fact that the interest charged on loans already
compensates creditors for potential losses by the setting of rates that reflect
the risk of default.16 In any event, many creditors may receive a greater
portion of the undersecured debt owed to them after the strip down of
their lien than they will in a foreclosure sale. 67
160. Id.
161. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
162. See Howard, supra note 21, at 412 (discussing counter-arguments to holding pre-
venting strip down of liens under § 506(d)).
163. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). Section 541(a)(1) provides:
The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an
estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and
by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
Id. (emphasis added).
164. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
165. See Howard, supra note 21, at 406-12 (comparing creditor's recovery under foreclo-
sure with recovery under strip down).
166. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. Rmv. 775, 777 (1987)
(discussing different policy justifications underlying bankruptcy law).
167. See Howard, supra note 21, at 406-12 (discussing differences in amount creditor
receives from foreclosure and strip down).
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The greatest impact of Dewsnup rests in the Court 's holding that liens
pass through bankruptcy unaffected. 6 Yet, in its search for legislative
intent, the Court made no mention of the history of the section 727 discharge
provision. 69 The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress designed
the Bankruptcy Code to give debtors a fresh start that includes both adequate
property for a debtor's return to normal life and the protection of the
debtor from creditor collection attempts. 70 The Bankruptcy Code increased
the protection provided to the consumer debtor under the National Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.171 Dewsnup failed to give the Bankruptcy Code's fresh
start due consideration.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup also raises important ques-
tions about reorganization cases under Chapter 12172 or Chapter 13.173 First,
it is not clear after Dewsnup whether undersecured creditors are subject to
the strip down of the unsecured portion of their lien on the debtors property
in a reorganization case. Second, does Dewsnup prevent confirmation of a
Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 reorganization plan containing the strip down of
a lien by the operation of sections 1225(a)(4)174 or 1325(a)(4), 175 which
require that an unsecured creditor receive as much under the reorganization
plan as it would receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation plan? Finally, does
the fresh start policy that Congress explicitly intended to be the foundation
of Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 negate the effect of Dewsnup on these
chapters? Dewsnup left these questions unanswered.
X. DEBTOR REORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTERS 12 AND 13
Congress created Chapter 13 to give the consumer debtor adequate
protection and to insure that the bankruptcy process would provide a fresh
168. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779.
169. See id. (providing Court's review of legislative history of Bankruptcy Code).
170. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text (describing role of discharge in fresh
start policy).
171. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text (describing increased protection of
consumer debtors).
172. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1988) (providing procedures for Chapter 12-"Adjust-
ment of Debts of a Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income").
173. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (providing procedures for Chapter
13-"Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income").
174. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (1988). Section 1225(a)(4) reads in pertinent part:
[Tihe court shall confirm a plan if ... the value, as of the effective date of the
plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed
unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if
the estate of the debtor was liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
Id.
175. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988). Section 1325(a)(4) reads in pertinent part:
[Tihe court shall confirm a plan if ... the value, as of the effective date of the
plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed
unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if
the estate of the debtor was liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
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start to the debtor after bankruptcy. 7 6 The purpose of Chapter 13 is to
allow the creation of a plan that provides full repayment of claims in some
cases and an equal percentage of claims in others. 17 7 This plan of reorgan-
ization allows the debtor to protect assets rather than liquidating them
under Chapter 7.178 The advantages of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 include
a right to remain in possession of all assets of the estate, a right to cure
defaults on long term home mortgage debts, and a broader "super"
discharge provision. 7 9 Only individuals with regular income and debt below
statutory maximums may take advantage of a Chapter 13 fresh start. i 0
Congress created Chapter 12 in the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986,181 closely modeling
it after Chapter 13 and designing it to give family farmers facing bankruptcy
a fighting chance to reorganize their debts and keep their land.8 2 Because
of the similarity of these Chapters, the analysis of strip down of liens in a
Chapter 13 plan after Dewsnup is the same as the analysis for a Chapter
12 case.'
XI. CONFCTS OVER THE STRIP DoWN OF LIENS IN CHAPTER 13 CASES
Prior to Dewsnup courts often approved a Chapter 13 debtor's use of
section 506(a) and section 1322(b)(2)1 4 to strip down an undersecured lien
to the value of the underlying collateral, except in cases when the collateral
was the debtor's primary residence. 8  The process is similar to that for a
Chapter 7 debtor. The debtor first uses section 506(a) to bifurcate the
176. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6078.
177. Id. at 6079.
178. Id.
179. See David S. Kennedy, Chapter 13 Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 MEM. ST. U. L.
REv. 137, 139 (1989) (discussing advantages of Chapter 13 discharge over Chapter 7 discharge).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). Section 109(e) states: "Only an individual with regular
income that owes, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured
debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000
... may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title." Id.
181. Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231
(1988)).
182. H.R. REP. No. 764, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5227, 5249.
183. See id. (stating that Chapter 12 is closely modeled after Chapter 13).
184. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988). Section 1322(b)(2) reads in pertinent part:
[T]he plan may ... modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders
of any class of claims; ....
Id.
185. See infra notes 186-214 and accompanying text (describing current controversy over
whether § 1322(b)(2) protects residential mortgages from strip down). Significant controversy
exists over the statutory construction of § 1322(b)(2) as it relates to the primary residence of
the debtor. Id.
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undersecured lien into a secured claim equal to the value of the collateral
and an unsecured claim for the portion of the lien in excess of the value
of the collateral.1 16 The debtor continues to make regular monthly payments
on the secured portion of the debt according to his original loan agree-
ment. 1
87
Under section 1322(b)(2)8 8 the debtor then relegates the unsecured
portion of the debt into a class that includes all other unsecured creditors. 1 9
This unsecured debt receives a pro rata share of the debtor's monthly
payment, which the approved reorganization plan establishes as appropriate
for the financial circumstances of the debtor. 9° After the three-to-five-year
period of the plan,19' the court grants the debtor a discharge for all remaining
unsecured debt. 92
For example, Leonard and Harriett Nobelman executed a note payable
to American Savings Bank and secured by a deed of trust on their principal
residence.1 93 During a subsequent voluntary petition under Chapter 13, the
Nobelmans filed a plan of reorganization valuing their residence at $23,500. 19
In their plan the Nobelmans proposed to make payments to American at
the mortgage contract rate only up to the value of their residence, using
section 506(a) to bifurcate the mortgage and section 1322(b)(2) to modify
it.'95 The balance of American's $71,335 claim would be treated as an
unsecured claim and paid equally with all other unsecured creditors.'
However, the N, obelmans' plan called for the unsecured creditors to receive
nothing.' 7 Thus, at the end of the Nobelmans' plan they would receive a
discharge of the unsecured claims, including American's, retain their resi-
dence, and owe American only the amount remaining on its secured claim. 9 s
It is here, at the discharge, that the statutory interpretation of Dewsnup
and the fresh start policies of the reorganization chapters clash most
186. See Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1990)
(describing bifurcation of undersecured lien in Chapter 13 case).
187. See Lindauer, supra note 18, at 260-61 (describing strip down process in Chapter 13
case).
188. See supra note 184 (providing text of § 1322(b)(2)).
189. See Lindauer, supra note 18, at 260-61 (describing strip down process in Chapter 13
case).
190. Id.
191. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988). Section 1322(c) provides: "The plan may not provide
for payments over a period that is longer than three years, unless the court, for cause, approves
a longer period, but the courf may not approve a period that is longer than five years." Id.
192. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
193. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 968 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).




198. See id. (describing strip down of mortgage in debtors' plan of reorganization).
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loudly. 99 However, it is at bifurcation that the controversy addressed by
Nobelman arises. 2°°
A bankruptcy court compared the precise meaning of section 1322(b)(2),
read in conjunction with section 506(a), to the "clarity of the Chicago River
on St. Patrick's Day. ' 20 1 Significant splits exist among courts of appeals,
district courts, and bankruptcy courts over the proper interpretation of
these statutes when the undersecured lien is on the debtor's primary resi-
dence. 202 Courts that support bifurcation of an undersecured residential
mortgage look to the compromise between the House and Senate billsm3
that led to the passage of the specific language in section 1322(b)(2) as an
indication of legislative intent to allow the strip down of residential mort-
gages to the extent they are unsecured.2" The House version allowed debtors
to modify the rights of both secured and unsecured claim holders. 205 The
Senate version included protection against modification for all real estate
mortgages.? Courts that support bifurcation interpret the adopted language,
even though not explicit in its meaning, to reflect a compromise between
the two versions, allowing modification of all claims, including residential




Courts disapproving of the bifurcation of a lien on the principal
residence of the debtor have relied on principles of statutory construction
to hold that such a use of section 506 vitiates the purpose of section
1322(b)(2), removing the protection that the statute clearly provides. 208 The
199. See infra notes 255-60 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between Dewsnup
and fresh start of reorganization chapters).
200. See infra notes 201-16 and accompanying text (discussing conflict over strip down
of residential mortgages in Chapter 13 cases).
201. Goins v. Diamond Mortgage Corp. (In re Goins), 119 B.R. 156, 158 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1990) (explaining that by custom river is dyed green on St. Patrick's Day).
202. See Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Sav., 967 F.2d 918, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1992) (allowing
strip down of residential mortgage); Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re
Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re
Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1413 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re
Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). But see Nobelman v. American Say.
Bank (In re Nobelman), 968 F.2d 483, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying strip down of residential
mortgage), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992); In re Ireland, 137 B.R. 65, 70 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1992) (same); In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 617-19 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); In re
Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (same).
203. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128 (citing statements of Rep. Don Edwards in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6436, 6481 and Sen. Dennis DeConcini in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6505, 6550).
204. Id.
205. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Collier App. 3 at 111, 537,
cited in Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127.
206. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in Collier App. 3 at VII, 573, cited
in Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128.
207. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990).
208. See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 968 F.2d 483, 486-87 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding that Congress designed statutory language to protect residential mortgage
1993]
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Nobelman v.
American Savings Bank (In re Nobelman),2 0 rejected the position of the
courts of appeals allowing bifurcation. 21 0 In its decision, the Fifth Circuit
first turned to the Dewsnup decision, citing the Supreme Court's statement
that the Court was not deciding the meaning of the words "allowed secured
claim" in other Bankruptcy Code sections. 21' The Nobelman court also
noted the Dewsnup Court's reliance in its holding on procreditor policy and
the presumption that pre-Code law is unchanged unless specifically changed
by Congress. 21 2 Ironically, the Nobelman court then looked to the plain
meaning of sections 506(a) and 1322(b)(2) and found apparent conflict
between the statutes. 2 3 The Fifth Circuit held that the specific language of
section 1322(b)(2) prevailed over the general language of section 506(a).
21 4
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Nobelman case. 21 5 Unfor-
tunately, given its questionable analysis and its place of isolation in the
Rehnquist Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence, Dewsnup provides little guid-
ance on the probable outcome of Nobelman.
216
XII. Tlrm EFFEcTs OF DEwsNUp ON CHAPTERS 12 AND 13
The most significant questions about the impact of Dewsnup arise when
a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 debtor attempts to strip down a lien as an
element of the debtor's reorganization plan. The Dewsnup Court intended
to avoid the application of its holding to other situations, involving different
facts, Chapters, or sections of the Bankruptcy Code.217 But it is because of
the Court's analysis and holding that the application of Dewsnup to Chapter
12 and 13 cases has proven unavoidable.
A. Arguments Against the Application of Dewsnup
to Chapters 12 and 13
Despite the Supreme Court's attempt to craft a narrow holding in
Dewsnup, the lower courts are split over Dewsnup's application in reorgan-
lenders), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1990) (same); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1990) (providing that
reorganization plan may modify rights of holders of secured claims other than claim only
secured by debtor's principal residence).
209. 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
210. Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobelman), 968 F.2d 483, 486-89 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
211. Id. at 487.
212. See id. (finding policy and pre-Code presumption Dewsnup used as support for
holding that strip down of residential mortgages prohibited by Code).
213. Id. at 488.
214. Id.
215. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
216. See supra notes 114-40 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's statutory
construction of Bankruptcy Code).
217. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (stating "[W]e therefore focus upon
the case before us and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on another day").
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ization cases.28 Both the Second and the Third Circuits have ruled that
Dewsnup does not apply to Chapter 13 cases. 2 9 In Bellamy v. Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,m the Second Circuit case, the creditor argued
that Dewsnup precluded the presupposition that "secured claim" in section
1322(b)(2) had the same meaning as "secured claim" in section 506(a).2
1
However, the Dewsnup Court did not hold that "secured claim" could
never be construed in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code as it was in
section 506(a).2n Further, some Code provisions specifically state that the
term "secured claim" should not be construed as defined in section 506(a).m
Unless that caveat is present, the section 506(a) definition should apply?2
The language differences between sections 506(d) and 1322(b)(2) also
suggest that Dewsnup does not govern the use of 1322(b)(2). M  Section
. 218. See Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Sav., 967 F.2d 918, 924-25 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding
Dewsnup limited to § 506(d) and thus inapplicable in Chapter 13 reorganization); Bellamy v.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 182-83 (2d Cir. 1992)
(same); In re Cardinale, 142 B.R. 42, 43 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (same); In re Leverett, 145
B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992) (finding that Dewsnup does not apply to Chapter
12 cases). But see Nobelman, 968 F.2d at 487 (holding that Dewsnup lends support to
prohibition against bifurcation of residential mortgages); In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364, 369 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that bifurcation of residential mortgage is permissible but that Dewsnup
prohibits avoidance of lien).
219. See Sapos, 967 F.2d at 924-25 (holding that Dewsnup does not apply in Chapter 13
cases); Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 182-83 (same).
220. 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992).
221. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 182
(2d Cir. 1992). In Bellamy, the United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered
whether a reorganization plan can ,bifurcate a residential mortgage lender's claim into its
secured and unsecured components and then treat the unsecured portion of the claim with
other unsecured lenders. Id. at 178. The creditors sought approval of a plan of reorganization
that relegated the mortgagee to the status of an unsecured creditor with respect to the portion
of the debt in excess of the value of the collateral, discharged the unsecured debt with the
other unsecured claims and reinstated the mortgage at its stripped down amount. Id. The
court began by analyzing the interplay between two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, §§
1322(b)(2) and 506(a). Id. at 178-79. First, the Bellamy court found that bifurcation of the
creditor's claim into secured and unsecured portions using § 506(a) does not modify the rights
of the creditor, as is prohibited by § 1322(b)(2). Id. at 180. The court then held that §
1322(b)(2) only protects the rights of the holder of a residential mortgage from modification
if the only security for that debt is the debtor's principal residence. Id. at 181. The court
found this interpretation of the statute to be consistent with the purpose of Chapter 13 and
the compromise language found in the legislative history. Id. at 182. Finally, the Bellamy
court held that Dewsnup v. Timm does not apply to prevent the strip down of liens under §
1322(b)(2). Id. at 182-84. The court reasoned that the different language of § 506(d) and §
1322(b)(2), the different motivating factors of the Dewsnup decision, and the different legislative
history and purpose make Dewsnup's analysis of § 506(d) inapposite to the interpretation of
§ 1322(b)(2). Id. Consequently, the Bellamy court held that a debtor can strip down a mortgage
to the value of the collateral, even if the property is the debtor's primary residence, under §
1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 186.
222. Id. at 186.
223. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1988) (providing that claim is secured claim to extent
allowed if holder of claim so elects under § l111(b)(1)(a), notwithstanding § 506(a)).
224. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 182.
225. Id. at 183.
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506(d) refers only to secured claims; section 1322(b)(2) refers to both secured
and unsecured claims.- More importantly, the language of section 506(d)
deals with the avoidance of liens that are not allowed; section 1322(b)(2),
as well as section 506(a), deal with allowed claims that are either secured
or unsecured.227 Finally, a major factor in the Dewsnup decision was the
failure to find unequivocal legislative intent to change the pre-Code concept
that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected. 8 The Bellamy court found
that Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code furthered the congressional scheme
by expressly contemplating that a debtor's plan of reorganization may
modify claims secured by real property.' 9
In Sapos v. Provident Institution of Savings,230 the Third Circuit adopted
the Bellamy analysis to find that Dewsnup did not apply to Chapter 13
cases231 In addition, the Tenth Circuit approved a Chapter 12 debtor's strip
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778-79 (1992).
229. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Co., 962 F.2d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citations omitted).
230. 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992).
231. Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Say., 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992). In Sapos, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether it should affirm the
bankruptcy court's approval of a Chapter 13 debtor's plan of reorganization, which bifurcated
the mortgagee's lien into a secured portion and an unsecured portion, thereby stripping down
the lien to the value of the collateral. Id. at 920. The debtor defaulted on payments to the
creditor and filed a Chapter 13 petition prior to the foreclosure sale. Id. at 922. The debtor's
second amended plan proposed to continue payment of the portion of the debt that equaled
the value of the collateral and to relegate the remaining balance on the mortgage to an
unsecured status, which the plan would pay on a pro rata basis with other allowed unsecured
creditors. Id. at 923. The bankruptcy court approved this plan over the objection of the
mortgagee. Id. The Third Circuit began its analysis with the impact of Dewsnup v. Timm on
Chapter 13 proceedings. Sapos, 967 F.2d at 924. The court voiced its agreement with Bellamy
v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992), to hold
that the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 506 in Dewsnup does not apply in a Chapter
13 reorganization. Sapos, 967 F.2d at 924-25. Next, the court looked at the teachings of a
prior Third Circuit case, Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir.
1990), to hold that the antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2) does not apply if the creditor
takes a security interest in personalty in addition to realty and that § 1322(b)(2) only protects
secured claims that remain after the application of § 506(a). Sapos, 967 F.2d at 925-26. The
court also found that the creditor's rights were not modified under Wilson, which held that
the use of § 506(a) to reduce a creditor's claim is not a modification of rights within the
meaning of the term in § 1322(b)(2). Id. at 926. Turning to the specifics of the debtor's plan
of reorganization, the Third Circuit found that the plan did not properly provide for adequate
curing of arrearages in mortgage payments as required by § 1322(b)(5). Id. at 926-28.
Consequently, the Sapos court refused to affirm the prior confirmation of the debtor's plan.
Id. at 928.
See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Sainz-Dean (In re Sainz-Dean), 143 B.R. 784,
787 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding that Dewsnup v. Timm decision does not apply to Chapter 13
case); Holmes v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. (In re Holmes), 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 751, *2
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (same); In re Cardinale, 142 B.R. 42, 43 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (same);
In re Dinsmore, 141 B.R. 499, 508 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (same); In re Govan, 139 B.R.
1017, 1022 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1992) (same).
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down of undersecured mortgages that the state held, noting that the court
was not faced with the problems Dewsnup had created.? 2 At least one
bankruptcy court also has held that Dewsnup does not apply to Chapter 12
cases, noting that the extension of Dewsnup to a Chapter 12 case would
defeat one of the primary purposes of the rehabilitative chapters by rendering
section 506(a) meaningless and precluding the finality necessary to the success
of the reorganization.233
B. Arguments Favoring Application of Dewsnup to Chapter 12 and 13
A bankruptcy court in a Chapter 13 case, In re Dyer,2a4 raised an
important counter-argument to the Second and Third Circuits' decisions.2
5
The court noted that Dewsnup had relied on an earlier Supreme Court
decision, Johnson v. Home State Bank.2 6 Johnson held that a Chapter 7
232. Crook v. Oklahoma ex reL Comm'rs of the Land Office, 966 F.2d 539, 539 n.1
(10th Cir. 1992).
233. In re Leverett, 145 B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992).
234. 142 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
235. In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364, 366-67 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992). In Dyer, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona considered whether the Supreme Court decision
in Dewsnup v. Timm overruled the Ninth Circuit decision in In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182
(9th Cir. 1989), thereby prohibiting the avoidance of a lien encumbering a Chapter 13 debtor's
principal residence. Dyer, 142 B.R. at 366. The bankruptcy court began its analysis by noting
that Dewsnup had relied upon an earlier Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991). Dyer, 142 B.R. at 366. Johnson had held that even though a
Chapter 7 proceeding discharged the personal liability of a debt, the in rem liability for the
claim survives and can be paid in a Chapter 13 plan. Id. at 367. The Dyer court called
Dewsnup, which interpreted § 506(d), "a logical extension of Johnson." Id. The court then
noted that In re Hougland did not rely on § 506(d), but instead used § 1322(b)(2) to allow
bifurcation of an undersecured claim in a Chapter 13 proceeding. Id. at 368-69. In light of
the Dewsnup and Hougland decisions, the bankruptcy court found that it could follow
Hougland and allow bifurcation of the creditor's undersecured claim, but must follow Dewsnup
to prevent avoidance of the unsecured portion the lien. Id. at 369. The debtor can extinguish
the in rem lien only by satisfaction of the entire indebtedness or through foreclosure proceed-
ings. Id. at 372. The bankruptcy court then criticized the Second Circuit's holding in Bellamy,
finding the analysis of the Court.of Appeals inconsistent with the in rem analysis of Johnson
and Dewsnup and unsupported by specific statutory provision. Id. at 373-74. The bankruptcy
court concluded that the in rem lien on the debtor's principal residence survived the discharge
at the termination of the Chapter 13 plan unless the plan paid the debt in full. Id.
236. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991). In Johnson, the Supreme
Court considered whether a debtor can include a mortgage lien in a Chapter 13 plan of
reorganization after the personal obligation of the debtor secured by the mortgaged property
has been discharged in a prior Chapter 7 proceeding. Id. at 2152. The debtor had filed a
Chapter 7 petition to halt foreclosure of his farm property after defaulting on a mortgage the
creditor held on the property. Id. Following discharge of the debtor's personal liability for
the loan and a lifting of the automatic stay against the foreclosure, the creditor reinstituted
the foreclosure proceedings. Id. Before the creditor could complete the foreclosure, the debtor
filed a Chapter 13 petition, listing the mortgage as a claim against his estate and proposing
to make installment payments on the loan equal to the creditor's judgment against the property.
Id. The Court first noted a distinction between the personal liability of a debtor, the in
personam liability, and the creditor's interest in the property that secures the right to repayment,
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discharge extinguishes only the personal liability of the debtor for a debt
that a lien secured, leaving an in rem claim that survives the bankruptcy
proceeding. 2 7 The Dyer court called Dewsnup a "logical extension of
Johnson. '238 Under Dewsnup, the Dyer court reasoned, while bifurcation
of the undersecured claim is allowed, the full amount of the lien on the
property, the in rem claim, continues to encumber the collateral after the
discharge of the debtor's personal liability.2 9 The Dyer court concluded
that the Dewsnup holding that all liens continue to pass through bankruptcy
unaffected precludes the strip down of liens in both Chapter 12 and Chapter
13 cases. The court explained that such preclusion exists even if section
1222(b)(2) or 1322(b)(2) allows bifurcation of the claim and the bankruptcy
discharge extinguishes the debtor's personal liability.24°
Nobelman also found Dewsnup applicable to Chapter 13 cases.24 The
Fifth Circuit interpreted the procreditor policy arguments in Dewsnup as
support for its holding that section 1322(b)(2) prohibits bifurcation of
residential mortgages242 The Nobelman court also adopted Dewsnup's one-
subsection-at-a-time approach to statutory interpretation as it read section
1322(b)(2) to protect residential mortgages.23 Therefore, strong arguments
exist both supporting and opposing the application of Dewsnup to Chapter
12 and Chapter 13 cases.2 4
C. Legislative History's Role in the Solution
Because the plain meaning of the relevant statutes provides few answers,
courts should use the policy and legislative intent for Chapter 12 and
Chapter 13 in determining Dewsnup's reach.2 5 However, the legislative
the in rem liability. Id. at 2153. The Court then held, following prior Supreme Court cases,
that the creditor's right to foreclose on the mortgage survives the bankruptcy discharge. Id.
Turning to the issue before it, the Court addressed the statutory construction of the term
"claim." Id. at 2154-56. The Court noted that it had previously held that Congress intended
to adopt the broadest available definition of "claim," as the language of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)
(Supp. 1991) indicated. Johnson, I11 S. Ct. at 2154. Because the surviving in rem lien was a
right to payment, it met the definition of claim the statute established. Id. The Court noted
that this conclusion was consistent with other parts of the Bankruptcy Code and that the
legislative background and history of the Code confirmed this statutory construction. Id. Thus,
the Johnson Court held that a mortgage lien remains a claim for purposes of a Chapter 13
proceeding that follows a Chapter 7 discharge of the debtor's personal liability. Id. at 2152.
237. Dyer, 142 B.R. at 366 (citing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2153
(1991)).
238. Id. at 367.
239. Id. at 370.
240. Id. at 369-70.
241. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 968 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 488.
244. See supra notes 218-43 and accompanying text (discussing arguments favoring and
opposing application of Dewsnup to Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases).
245. See infra notes 246-60 and accompanying text (applying policy and legislative intent
of Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 to question of Dewsnup's application).
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histories of Chapters 12 and Chapter 13 offer no clear answers about the
intended treatment of liens under the reorganization chapters. 6 The lack
of a conference committee report for the Bankruptcy Code, which typically
would provide information about the compromises reached, and the domi-
nant roles of Senator Dennis DeConcini and Representative Don Edwardsu7
mean that the sparse floor statements of the these two legislators are the
primary sources for the legislative intent of the Bankruptcy Code.m Yet
the stated purposes of these two reorganization chapters are different from
the purpose of Chapter 7.2 9 The legislative histories of both Chapter 12
and Chapter 13 show a clear intent to allow the debtor to keep his property
after the bankruptcy.250 The application of Dewsnup thus appears to create
results contrary to that intent. Further, the differing House and Senate
versions of section 1322(b)(2) 251 indicate that Congress addressed the issue
of lien avoidance and resolved the issue by allowing it in certain circum-
stances, as evidenced by the compromise language that became law.
2 2
Following the Dewsnup Court's own analysis, 25 3 this legislative intent to
change the pre-Code practice that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected
means that Dewsnup does not apply to Chapter 12 and 13 cases.
254
Finally, it is unclear whether Dewsnup protects liens at all bankruptcy
discharges or only at Chapter 7 discharges. The Chapter 12 and Chapter
246. Goins v. Diamond Mortgage Corp. (In re Goins), 119 B.R. 156, 161 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1990).
247. See Begier v. United States, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990) (commenting on lack of
significant legislative history of Bankruptcy Code).
248. See id. (providing text of floor statements by sponsoring legislators).
249. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079 (stating purpose of Chapter 13); H.R. REp. No. 764, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5249 (stating purpose of Chapter
12); S. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5792-93 (stating purpose of Chapter 7).
250. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079 (stating that benefit of Chapter 13 reorganization plan is that it
allows debtor to protect assets, rather than liquidate them under Chapter 7); H.R. REp. No.
764, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5249 (stating that
Congress designed Chapter 12 to give family farmers fighting chance to reorganize debts and
keep land).
251. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (allowing modification of rights of
holders of both secured and unsecured claims); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (providing
for modification of rights of holders of secured and unsecured claims other than claims wholly
secured by mortgages on real property).
252. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (providing that plan may modify rights of holders
of secured claims except for claim secured by debtor's primary residence); see also 124 CoNo.
REc. H32,350, H32,409 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6481 (containing
statement of Rep. Don Edwards that § 1322(b)(2) represents compromise between House and
Senate bills).
253. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) (finding that change from pre-
Code practice would require mention in legislative history).
254. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (discussing legislative intent for Chapter
12 and Chapter 13).
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13 discharge is a "super" discharge, which is much broader than the
discharge that Chapter 7 provides.2Y5 For example, the grounds for objecting
to a discharge found in section 727(a) 256 do not apply in Chapter 13 cases.2
7
More importantly, Chapter 13 discharges extinguish the nondischargeable
obligations contained in section 523(a)258 that survive, with minor exceptions,
Chapter 7 discharges. 9 Dewsnup's protection of liens does not provide the
kind of fresh start the drafters of Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 intended to
make available to eligible debtors.m
D. Additional Problems with Dewsnup
Regardless of the treatment of liens, Dewsnup creates an additional
problem for the strip down of a lien under section 1222(b)(2) or 1322(b)(2).
For plan confirmation, section 1325(a)(4) requires that the present value of
property distributed for each unsecured claim not be less than what the
holder of the unsecured claim would have received if the debtor had
liquidated under Chapter 7.261 Chapter 12 has an identical requirement in
section 1225(a)(4). 2 2 Now that Dewsnup prohibits the strip down of liens
in Chapter 7, bankruptcy courts will have a difficult, if not impossible,
task in determining the amount the unsecured creditor would have received
in a Chapter 7 proceeding. 263 Dewsnup's impact on reorganization cases
may reflect its inapplicability outside of Chapter 7 cases, or it may mean
that a Chapter 12 or 13 plan with a stripped down lien is not confirmable
by the bankruptcy court.26
Dewsnup creates serious problems for Chapter 12 and 13 reorganization
cases. It inhibits, or perhaps prevents, the functioning of Chapter 12 and
255. See Kennedy, supra note 179, at 158-59 (discussing operation of Chapter 13 super
discharge); see also 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988) (providing authority, scope and exceptions to
discharge in Chapter 7 bankruptcy); id. § 1228 (providing authority, scope and exceptions to
discharge in Chapter 12 bankruptcy); id. § 1328 (providing authority, scope and exceptions to
discharge in Chapter 13 bankruptcy).
256. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988) (providing certain grounds upon which court shall not
grant debtor discharge).
257. See Kennedy, supra note 179, at 158 (discussing differences between Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 in grounds for objections to discharge).
258. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
259. See Kennedy, supra note 179, at 159 (discussing exceptions to super discharge of
debts under Chapter 13).
260. See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text (describing fresh start policies of
Chapters 12 and Chapter 13).
261. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988); see supra note 175 (providing text of 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (1988)).
262. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4) (1988); see supra note 174 (providing text of 11 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(4) (1988)).
263. See Howard, supra note 9, at 2 (discussing potential problems created by Dewsnup
in operation of other parts of Bankruptcy Code).
264. See id. (discussing implications of serious problems if Dewsnup applies in Chapter
13 cases).
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Chapter 13 in the manner intended by Congress. 265 If the Dyer analysis is
accurate,2 6 Dewsnup may result in fewer reorganization plans and more
foreclosures or deeds in lieu of foreclosure. Family farmers and consumer
debtors will not be able to protect their farms or homes. This result is
contrary to the legislative intent that Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 protect
the assets of consumer debtors and family farmers.
2 67
Dewsnup may require bankruptcy courts to continue to participate in
reorganization plans well beyond the time period envisioned by the legislative
drafters. In protecting the in rem lien, Dewsnup will defeat the intent of
clear statutory language by granting unsecured creditors access to future
earnings beyond the time period envisioned by the drafters. 268 Any improve-
ments or maintenance that the debtor performs on the collateral will accrue
to the creditor until the value of the collateral exceeds the lien amount. As
a result, Dewsnup will also act as a disincentive to property owners to
maintain and improve their holdings. Finally, it will allow lienholders to
retain their leverage over their debtors, a condition the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code intended to prevent. 219
XIII. CONCLUSION: THE OPPORTUNiTY OF
NOBELMAN V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK
Despite the Court's limiting pronouncement, 270 the holding, analysis,
and statutory construction principles of Dewsnup have created uncertainty
in many other areas of the Bankruptcy Code. Dewsnup has left undefined
when statutory language is clear and when it is ambiguous. The Dewsnup
holding implied that a statute is ambiguous when the parties dispute its
meaning. 271 The Court suggested that a statutory term or phrase has different
meanings in different sections of the Bankruptcy Code,272 but the Court
failed to indicate how bankruptcy courts and practitioners could determine
when different meanings would apply. Dewsnup held that liens pass through
Chapter 7 bankruptcies unaffected, 273 but left unanswered the obvious
265. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 429 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6384-85 (stating congressional purpose of Chapter 13 reorganization plan); H.R. REP.
No. 764, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5249 (stating
congressional purpose of Chapter 12 reorganization plan).
266. See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text (providing description of bankruptcy
court's application of Dewsnup in Chapter 13 case).
267. See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying notes (describing fresh start policies of
Chapter 12 and Chapter 13).
268. See I1 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988) (providing that court may not approve plan providing
payments over period greater than five years); id. § 1222(c) (same).
269. H.R. Rm,. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 123-24 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6084-85.
270. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (describing Court's attempt to
limit its holding to specific facts in case).
271. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 777 (1992).
272. Id. at 778 n.3.
273. Id. at 778-79.
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question of the treatment of liens under the reorganization chapters. The
Court in Dewsnup turned to policy considerations and the presumption that
pre-Code law is unchanged by the Bankruptcy Code unless intent is to the
contrary, 274 but then quickly returned to plain meaning as the Court's
statutory construction hallmark in the next four bankruptcy cases. 275
The Supreme Court's holding in Dewsnup that a Chapter 7 debtor
cannot employ section 506(d) to strip down the value of an undersecured
lien to the value of the collateral comports with the legislative intent and
history of Chapter 7 and the Court's prior decisions dealing with the survival
of liens in bankruptcy proceedings. However, this consistency comes at the
dear price of troubling statutory analysis and serious questions about the
decision's impact on other parts of the Bankruptcy Code. Further, the
Court's holding is not consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory
language. With Nobelman scheduled for orallarguments in the 1992 Term,
the Supreme Court can correct these problems.
First, the Supreme Court should use the opportunity Nobelman provides
to reduce its reliance on plain meaning as its primary tool of statutory
construction and to revive the use of the tools found in Kelly. 76 Plain
meaning's greatest defect is that it provides no method with which courts
can accurately interpret the Bankruptcy Code. Plain meaning begs the
question, "Plain to whom?" The words and phrases of the Bankruptcy
Code are like the words and phrases in every other statute; that is, they
have multiple meanings. 277 The correct meaning of statutory language is
determined by evaluating the word or phrase within its context.278 That
context includes not only the surrounding words or sections in the statute,
but also the law existing at the time of the statute's passage, the legislature's
purpose and intent in passage, and the legal and real world context in which
the statute must operate.27 9 The Court's reliance on plain meaning has
blinded it to the context of the Bankruptcy Code and, as a result, to the
real world consequences of its interpretations. °
In place of the plain meaning doctrine, the Court should develop a
bankruptcy jurisprudence sensitive to the context of statutory language.Y
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (describing statutory construction in
four bankruptcy cases after Dewsnup).
276. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1986) (using deference to federalism and
policy of following pre-Code law unless congressional intent to contrary); supra notes 111-19
and accompanying text (discussing statutory interpretation by Supreme Court prior to 1989).
277. See L.H. LaRue, Statutory Interpretation: Lord Coke Revisited, 48 U. Prrr. L. Rev.
733, 733 (1987) (discussing use of context in statutory interpretation).
278. See id. at 734-39 (discussing different contexts relevant to statutory interpretation).
279. See id. (listing different contexts relevant to statutory interpretation)d
280. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Cost of Incoherence: A
Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due
Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 Vrm~r. L. REv. 687, 689 (1992) (providing analysis of
Supreme Court's use of plain meaning in statutory interpretation).
281. See Larue, supra note 277, at 734-39 (discussing importance of context in statutory
interpretation).
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The rebuttable presumption of Kelly, that the Bankruptcy Code merely
codified judge-made pre-Code bankruptcy law, should be established as the
starting point in statutory interpretation. Statutory language clearly different
from pre-Code law would rebut this presumption.
If the Kelly presumption survives this analysis, the Court next should
look to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code for evidence to rebut
the presumption. Finding none, the Court should apply a pre-Code inter-
pretation of the statute. If the Court finds evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption, it then should look to the purpose of the statute and the
Bankruptcy Code and evaluate interpretation possibilities in light of the text
of the statute and its operation in the real world. The correct interpretation
will be the one that operates in the statutory and real world context to
fulfill the purpose Congress intended.
12
The Court should apply this statutory interpretation scheme in Nobel-
man. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, liens on real property passed
through bankruptcy unaffected.32 The legislative history of both Chapter
12 and Chapter 13 reflect a desire by Congress for family farmers to be
able to keep their farms and for consumer debtors to be able to keep their
houses.2 This congressional desire is supported by the "super" discharge
afforded both Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 debtors.2 5 Finally, sections
1222(b)(2) and 1322(b)(2) specifically provide that the reorganization plan
may "modify the rights of holders of secured claims. ' ' 2 6 A lien is a right
of its holder to proceed against the property for the payment of a debt
obligation.w Thus, both the legislative history and the specific language of
the statute provide evidence of legislative intent to allow debtors to strip
down liens in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 plans. This rebuts the pre-Code
presumption and renders Dewsnup inapplicable to Chapter 12 and Chapter
13 cases.
The Court should next examine the statute at issue in Nobelman-
section 1322(b)(2)-in its context. The legislative history of this section
indicates that its language was the result of a compromise between a House
bill that provided no protection to residential mortgage holders and a Senate
bill that provided total protection for this category of creditor.M8 The fact
282. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43-53 (1986) (using deference to federalism and
policy of following pre-Code law unless congressional intent to contrary); Larue, supra note
277, at 734-39 (discussing importance of context in statutory interpretation).
283. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
284. See supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text (discussing fresh start policy in Chapter
12 and Chapter 13).
285. See supra notes 179, 181-8 and accompanying text (discussing super discharge for
Chapter 12 and noting similarity of Chapter 12 to Chapter 13).
286. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988); see supra note 184 (providing text of § 1322(b)(2)).
Id. § 1222(b)(2). Section 1222(b)(2) reads: "IT]he plan may ... modify the rights of holders
of secured claims, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders
of any class of claims ... ." Id.
287; See 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (providing definition of lien).
288. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text (describing House and Senate versions
of § 1322(b)(2)).
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that the final bill restricted the modification of claims to those "other than
a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principle residence," 2 9 which is language not in the House version,
is an indication of some purpose of protecting residential mortgage holders
in section 1322(b)(2). Viewed in the context of sections 506(a) 290 and
1222(b)(2), 291 the similar section in Chapter 12, in which a family farmer
can strip down any undersecured. lien in a Chapter 12 reorganization plan,
the only logical purpose of the phrase at issue is to prevent the strip down
of the mortgage on the debtor's primary residence. Alternative interpreta-
tions render the questioned phrase superfluous. Thus, under this statutory
analysis, Chapter 13 debtor cannot strip down the mortgage on his primary
residence under sections 506(a) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Nobelman provides an opportunity for the Court to correct the harms of
Dewsnup and to provide further guidance to bankruptcy courts and prac-
titioners in the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
William E. Callahan, Jr.
289. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (providing that reorganization plan can modify
rights of certain claimholders).
290. Id. § 506(a).
291. Id. § 1222(b)(2).
